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Federal and European Union Policy Making 
- A Comparative Perspective1
 
Søren Dosenrode2
       
 
Summary 
By using the policy cycle approach, this paper compares the policy-process in a 
number of Anglo-Saxon type federations with the policy-process in continental-
European style federations from within the European Union (EU) area.  The 
comparison would reveal: a) distinct different styles of policy making in 
European style federations in relation with the Anglo-Saxon ones. b) that the 
policy-process in the EU resembles that of the European style federations, and c) 
the Constitutional Treaty (CT) or a possible CT-light would strengthen the 
federal policy-making characteristics already present in the EU understood as a 
polity of state character. 
 
 
Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the federal policy-process within a number of 
federations3 as well as within the EU; how federal respectively EU-laws are 
made and the degree of state involvement in the process.4 This topic is rarely 
treated on a systematic, comparative basis and  there is a need for further 
                                                          
1  The gathering of empery for the following analysis was supported by the Obel Family 
Foundation, Aalborg. I gladly express my gratitude! 
2  I would like to thank Mammo Muchie, Staffan Zetterholm and Wolfgang Zank, Aalborg, 
for their comments; omissions are of course my own responsibility. The paper is a revised 
version of a chapter on the same topic, now  published in Approaching the EUropean 
Federation (Dosenrode, 2007).  
3  Although there seems to be different opinions as to whether a federal organization of a 
state has an impact on the policy outcome, there is not surprisingly agreement that a 
federal organization inevitably has another kind of policy-making process than a unitary 
state. Arend Lijphardt e.g. mentions that federal state institutions of government are 
different from unitary ones, and that federal states – generally speaking – have several 
constraints for policy-making (1999). On the other hand Braun (2000, p. 2) rightly points 
out that quantitative analysis has not yet clearly proven that there is a clear difference in 
policy-output between federal and unitary states; some analysis suggest there is, others 
that there is not. If we turn to international relations theory (IR) one claim of the neo- or 
structural realist approach is that states tend to copy the leading states in order to survive. 
Thus it will not be surprising if policy outcome tend to look alike. Still a systematic 
comparison of a number of ‘typical’ federations and unitary states would be interesting but 
is without the limits of this paper. 
4  This implies that this paper analyses how federal legislation is made and implemented, 
and not inter-state cooperation, although this kind of cooperation has a large impact on the 
federal system (Ann Bowman 2004). At EU-level this implies that this paper concentrates 
on supranational legislation. 
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analysis to gain insight in the policy-process of federations as a starting-point for 
further comparisons with non-federal states5. The policy- process may be 
roughly divided into two traditions6: the European (cooperative) and the Anglo-
Saxon (dual) 7. 
 
Anglo-Saxon Style Federations: 
 
• some kind of Westminster-democracy, or majoritarian-democracy 
• Consensus seeking is not necessary and thus not a part of the political 
culture. (Lijphart points out that this model is ‘exclusive, competitive and 
adversarial’ (1999, p. 2) 
 
European Style Federations: 
 
• some kind of consensus culture, most outspoken in Switzerland. According 
to Lijphart this implies a democracy (1999, p. 2):  ‘[…] characterized by 
inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise; for this reason, consensus 
democracy could also be termed “negotiation democracy […]”’.  
 
The working hypothesis being that the Anglo-Saxon federations, in this context 
the US, Australia and Canada differ significantly in their mode of policy-making 
from that of the European ones8. The space available in this paper as well as the 
purpose of finding a few ‘arch-types’ may give it a certain superficial look, but 
it is the hope that it will be able to isolate central features of the policy-process 
in federations and in the EU9. 
 
When one is going to analyze the Constitution Treaty (CT) or a possible 
‘Constitution Treaty Light (CT-Light)’, it is of a certain interest, whether it is 
possible to find, to distillate some kind of European federal policy-model, which 
may have been the – tacit – model of the CT, and which suits the European 
political culture, thus giving it better chances of survival and development. If 
                                                          
5  To my knowledge only a few comparative studies of policy-making in federations exists. 
Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt (2000) and Ditmar Braun (2000 and 2003) have made such 
analysis  from a federal policy perspective,, and only Braun has used a strict frame of 
analysis (2003). 
6  I refer to Dosenrode 2007, Chapter 2.  
7  Agranoff & McGuire claims that the US never was a dual federation (2004. p. 500); this is 
contested by many e.g. Pierson (1991, p. 464) 
8  It is clear from the outset, that the federations within the two groups varies e.g. does the 
US not seriously try to introduce fiscal equalization whereas Canada does (Pierson 1995, 
pp. 463-473). 
9  It follows that a lot of details and the existing complexity will not be done full justice; e.g. 
Hanpf & Toonen (eds.) will most likely be critical to this approach. 
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there is such a European culture, how does it correspond to the decision-making 
in the EU of today and in the CT? This is the topic of this paper.  
 
This paper starts out with introducing the policy-cycle as a heuristic tool to 
understand the policy-making process in general. It will be used to structure the 
analysis of the federation in question and the EU. Then follows an analysis of 
the decision-making process federations10 and in the (Nice- and CT-) EU. In the 
conclusion we try to answer the initial question. 
 
The policy-cycle 
As mentioned is the concept of the policy-cycle a heuristic tool, which illustrates 
the making of policies in modern democratic states. It builds on the assumptions 
that policy-making is: a) a process; b) a process that begins long before a policy-
proposal is presented in a parliament; and c) that the process can be divided in 
stages or phases. It also assumes that the policy-process once begun continues, 
thus the metaphor of a ‘policy-cycle’. The policy-cycle approach has been 
criticized; i.e. for giving the impression that the policy-process is strait forward, 
mowing swiftly from one phase to the next (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, pp. 
1-4, Sabatier 1993, pp. 116-148). And that criticism is of course true, the policy-
process can be very muddy and fare away from strait-forward, moving neatly 
from one phase to another. Also the approach may indicate a rationality not 
necessarily present in policy-making11 but when one has recognized this, and 
taken care of it in the concrete analysis, the policy-analysis approach is a useful 
tool as its division of the process in a number of phases. Wayne Parsons has put 
it like this (1995, p. 80): 
 
If we put aside the stagiest model [the policy-cycle and alike, SD] the choice 
is either a bewildering array of ideas, frameworks and theories, or the 
acceptance of another alternative model. In broad terms, therefore, the stagiest 
framework does allow us to analyze complexities of the real world, with the 
proviso that, when we deploy it as a heuristic device, we must remember that 
it has all the limitations of any map or metaphor. 
 
                                                          
10  This analysis includes Australia, Canada and USA on one side, and Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland and the EU on the other. Belgium has been left out, as it is still trying to 
develop its policy-making, and Spain and Italy as they are ‘in the making’, what is les 
interesting when trying to define an archtype federation (but this does of course not imply, 
that federations are static they do develop as e.g. Germany, which is in the middle of a 
‘federalism reform’ which will strengthen the role of the states). 
11  Everett (2003) has criticized the ‘rationality’ of the approach, as well as what she saw as a 
‘mechanic’, and a ‘how to make efficient policies’ approach to policy making. I agree with 
her basic criticism, that the policy cycle is mainly an analytical tool, but find that she is 
exaggerating the actual ‘belief’ in those concepts by authors such as Edwards.  
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Besides, the policy-cycle approach does not only highlights the phase 
traditionally scrutinized by lawyers and political scientists, the decision-making 
phase, but also draws attention the other very important phases in the whole 
policy-process. Additionally it reminds us, that actors may be different at the 
different stages, and that the importance of the various policy-arenas varies 
during the process. 
 
The next question to be answered is how many phases or stages does the policy-
process have. Various authors have various stages, but the author of this chapter 
has in previous works leaned on Adrienne Windhoff-Héritiers five phases model 
(Dosenrode 1997 and 2002). My argument in supporting this number is purely 
pragmatic: fewer phases will make the analysis too crude and more to detailed to 
keep an overview especially in comparative studies. Thus Windhoff-Héritiers 
model (1987) will be applied here, too. 
 
The five phases are: Problem-definition, Agenda-setting, Decision-making, 
Implementation and Evaluation. The problem-definition phase is muddy. No 
institution is responsible for generating and defining policy-problems. Thus it is 
hardly tangible and difficult to analyze. A policy-problem has to be perceived by 
someone as a problem and it must be possible to solve it politically. The 
potential policy-problem may come up in many ways, but it is certain that mass-
media, political groups as well as grass-root movements are essential, and 
adding to this: the resources (understood broadly) they are willing to invest in 
promoting an issue as ‘policy-problem’.  
 
When the problem is established, the next step is to have it placed on the 
political agenda and that is by no means an easy task. The agenda-setting phase 
(second phase) is, with Windhoff-Héritires words, the bridge between the 
problem-definition and the decision-making (1987, p. 69). As for the content of 
the agenda, Windhoff-Héritier remind us, that the majority of issues on the 
agenda are old issues or routine-questions, and that only a small part are actually 
new questions (1993, p. 87). This is so, because it takes power and resources to 
place a new issue on the political agenda. There will be actors who are not 
interested in the policy-problem being set on the agenda at all, and others who 
would like to reformulate it, to suit their purposes. The decision-making phase 
(third phase), is the one normally looked at with the greatest interest by scholars. 
It is the phase, where a policy-decision is negotiated and made in the formal 
political setting. It is followed by the implementation phase12, in which the 
policy-decision is supposed to be put to work. After a while, a policy is 
sometimes evaluated. This last phase may lead to changes in the policy, no 
                                                          
12  The term ‘implementation’ or ‘implementation studies’ had its hay-days in the 70s and 
80s, was mixed up with ‘regulation’ and ‘innovation’ in the 90s, and is now back in its 
own right (cf. Schofield & Sausman (2004), Hill (2003), Riccucci (2005)).  
 4
changes or the termination of the policy. Demand for changes may set of the 
policy-cycle anew13. 
 
 
The Policy-Cycle in Federations and in the EU 
The following analysis of the (federal respectively the supranational) policy-
making processes in federations and in the EU is meant to construct arch-types, 
thus it will be possible to find many derivations, when looking at one specific 
polity. But the point is to see, whether there are general characteristic, which 
may help to analyze, classify and thus understand decision-making in 
federations14.  
It goes without saying that policy-making in federations is more complex than in 
unitary states: not one government with its bureaucracy but governments with 
their bureaucracies; not one parliament but several; not only national parties, but 
also territorial parties with their own territorial logic and so forth. In other 
words, the amount of veto points, possibilities of making alliances and by-
passing in federations is much larger than in unitary states. Braun (in Braun 
2000, p. 8) points in this direction when stating that: ‘Without any doubt, federal 
systems create more opportunities for smaller and regional parties [... ] to find an 
access to political power’. 
 
Problem-definition phase 
When policies in Anglo-Saxon type federations is characterized, grosso modo, 
by segregation, understood as policy-making on the federal level includes 
mainly federal actors, and policy-making on the member-state level includes 
primarily member-state actors, one has two, theoretically separate policy-cycles. 
This is the result of a fairly strict division of labor. But when this is said, the 
nature of the problem-definition phase, being open and ‘muddy’, allows for 
actors from both the federal and the member-state level to be active. As 
mentioned above is this phase hard to analyze, but important actors are mass-
media, political groups (nationally based or member state based), federal- or 
member-state bureaucracies as well as grass-root movements. An important 
asset in this, and the other phases is energy, understood as resources. It is 
                                                          
13  Implementation and especially evaluation of federal laws will be the topic of this authors 
next project, thus it will be treated in a more rudimentary way in this paper as it seam to 
form a lacuna in comparative federalism studies. 
14  It may also have been fruitful to extend this analysis to include a comparative analysis of 
the influence of the parties and the electorate in decision making process; in e.g. Germany 
the party system is more important than the territorial, understood as the governments of 
the Bundesländer. Self (1985) stresses the importance of the parties and the electorate in 
the policy-making process. Equally interesting would be to include an analysis of which 
levels (federal or member state) the different kinds of policies (distributive, regulatory, re-
distributive) were placed at in European style federations and in Anglo-Saxon style. But 
unfortunately this goes beyond the limits of this paper.   
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essential, if something understood as an issue is going to be accepted as ‘policy-
problem’. The same can be said for European style federations, only that the 
tendencies are more outspoken, due to the tradition of cooperation between the 
federal and the member state level. 
 
The Nice- and CT-EU are different in this respect. The nature of the EU itself is 
disputed; it ranges from those who ascribe state-quality to the EU (McKay 2001, 
Dosenrode 2003a), over those who consider the EU some kind of multi-level 
polity (Hix 1999) to those still regarding the EU as primarily international and 
intergovernmental arrangement (Moravcsik 1998). This is not the place to 
answer the question of the nature of the EU15 (I refer to Dosenrode 2007, chapter 
9). In the problem definition phase there is not the same degree of a public 
opinion union-wide, as there is in the member-states. There is an overwhelming 
lack of common media, which could facilitate the creation of a common frame 
of discussion. Only rarely do the populations of the member-states discuss the 
same issues at the same time; examples of this sporadic European opinion were 
the discussions of the participation in the Iraq-war, of the French and Dutch ‘no’ 
to the CT and Danish newspapers cartoons of the Islamic prophet Mohammed. 
Thus potential policy-issues will ‘arise’ in or around the Commission, which is 
                                                          
15  It may be useful to remember a few characteristics of the Nice-EU. The most striking 
feature of the EU is the handing over of national sovereignty from the member-states to 
the EU, i.e. the establishment of a supranational polity, which enacts binding legislation 
for the member-states, thus trespassing the border between confederation and federation. 
Under the supranational level, there still is a national level, consisting of 27 states, all of 
liberal democratic character. Below the state-level there is an increasingly important sub-
national level of regions (Dosenrode 1995, Dosenrode & Halkier 2003, Lähteenmäki-
Schmidt, chapter 7 in Dosenrode, 2007). This creates a hyper-complex decision making 
process. The Nice-EU consists of three kinds of cooperation among the member-states and 
the Union: a) a supranational one, where the member-states have handed over their 
competencies to the Union and its institutions (e.g. foreign trade, and - for some states -  
the economic and monetary policy) b) a quasi-intergovernmental area (Common Foreign 
and Security Policy), where certain rules limit the sovereignty of the member-states, and 
c) a purely intergovernmental area, where the role of the Union is to be facilitator (Justice 
and Home Affairs). In other words, a system, where some competencies rest with the 
union, some are mixed, and some rest with the member-states, much like in a federation. If 
one looks at the primary institutions, one sees the European Commission, which initiate 
Union legislation; a European Council where the heads of state and government meet to 
consult, coordinate and also launch initiatives for the Union and make decisions, which 
may result in legislation thus being a strong second chamber; there is a Council of 
Ministers where government members of the member-states decides on the initiatives of 
the Commission mostly by majority voting, and the European Parliament, which within 
certain policy areas has a veto-right towards the Council of Ministers, and within other has 
a right to advice the Council. Also there is a European Court of Justice, which is a 
supreme court within certain areas, and there is an independent European Central Bank. 
For an in-depth analysis I refer to Dosenrode (2007, chapter 9). 
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very open to ideas. This openness is used by lobbyists, member state 
governments and the European Parliament. It is worth remembering that no 
‘extra-Commission’ actor has a right to deliver an opinion in this phase. If the 
Commission should be interested in a proposal, an idea, it will either ask an 
already existing consultative committee or more seldom from an expert 
committee to sound the idea. The work in this and the next phase is 
characterized by an outspoken lack of rules and transparency (e.g. meetings are 
not recorded, and the public is not informed which actors were present at the 
meeting). 
 
The only new incitement the CT would bring is the explicit mentioning of the 
already existing idea of promoting ‘Europe-wide’ political parties, with the 
explicit aim of creating a European political consciousness (Art.I-46.4)16.   
 
If one should compare the federations and the EU in this phase, the largest 
difference is the lack of an all-European arena for discussions of common 
interest i.e. a European opinion. This implies a tendency of particularistic issues 
being brought up, at the costs of common European issues developing.  This is 
attempted solved by giving one institution the right and duty to initiate ideas 
designed at strengthening the development of all the Union. In this work the 
Commission depends on in-put from its environment: lobbyists, grassroots 
movements, member-state governments, the other institutions.  
 
The fairly clear-cut original monopoly of the Commission as ‘integration motor’ 
has been eroded by the growing power of the European Council as well as the 
Council which may also make in-put to the legislative process, not unlike a 
second chamber in a federation17. In this way at kind of ‘parallel’ policy-cycle 
‘interferes’ as the request of the Council implies that a problem-definition phase, 
an agenda-sitting phase and a decision-making phase have already taken place 
for the Council to be able to formulate its request. The CT in its original form 
does not change the present, complex situation, and the EP still lacks the right to 
take an initiative itself.  
 
The difference of the EP’s role is clearest compared to the Anglo-Saxon 
federations, and less so towards the European style federations. In all cases it is 
the elites, understood as governments, bureaucracies, political parties and 
lobbyists etc. who play important roles. For an American Middle-Western 
farmer, the distance from Iowa to Washington DC, is not much shorten than for 
a Danish Farmer to Brussels, perhaps even at the contrary. 
 
                                                          
16  Thorlakson (2005) presents an interesting analysis of the European party system. 
17  Concerning the specific role under co-decision Burns (2004) argues that the Commission 
is still exercises agenda-setting and gate-keeeping. 
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The Agenda-Setting Phase 
When an issue has been recognized as political issue the next step is to make 
sure, that it is placed on the political agenda. Resources and stubbornness are 
paramount assets in this phase, too. This phase is characterized by the fact, that 
it is the preparation to the decision-making phase; the issue is now recognized as 
a policy-problem, and it is being discussed with the purpose of making a policy 
out of it – or exactly not. Thus when an issue has been placed on the political 
agenda, it constitutes a qualitative leap compared to the problem-definition 
phase, where the problem can be discussed in a rather informal way. It goes for 
the Nice-EU, the CT-EU as well as for the federations, that what there may have 
been of ‘spontaneity’ in the up-coming of an issue disappears in this phase. If 
the political parties have not been active previously, they will join the process 
now. The increased formality of the process gives various political institutions 
(federal parliament / European Parliament, member-state parliaments, member-
state governments / council of ministers, political parties, interest organizations 
etc.) an important role. 
 
Theoretically there is no difference between the federal states and the EU (Nice 
& CT) concerning the ways one secures the placing of an issue on the agenda18. 
There are at least three obvious ways to secure that an issue is placed and remain 
on the political agenda: 1) One good way for an interest organization or a 
political party is to commit the member-state government to a political issue19. 
Apart from the status the promotion of a member-state government gives a 
proposal, one may expect the issue to have been prepared and looked at by the 
governmental bureaucracy. 2) The interested actors may also try to use the 
federal parliament / the European parliament to secure an issues place on the 
agenda, and then 3) the actors may try to convince the state-bureaucracy (on 
either levels) of the issue’s importance. In all cases it helps, if one is able to 
formulate the issue in such a way that it looks as if a policy-decision would 
benefit the public. These three ways are open to actors in EU-member states as 
well as in federations. But looked at in reality, it turns out that for EU-actors, the 
European Parliament, in spite of its right to suggest the Commission to look into 
a matter, in this phase, is less influential than a federal parliament in a nation-
state. Thus where as actors in national federations have three channels of access, 
the actors from the EU-member states prefer going via the member-states 
political system, ending with it government or to lobby the Commission directly. 
                                                          
18   For a discussion of lobbyism in the EU, see e.g. the classical work Mazey & Richards 
(1993). Alternatively, see Dosenrode & Sidenius (1999), or Eising (2003).        
19  Article 208 Nice-Treaty, and article III-345 of the CT gives the right to the Council to 
invite the Commission to undertake investigations into a policy-problem, with the aim of 
proposing means to reach a common goal. This is a de facto right to initiate a policy 
initiative from the Commission. 
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A special, fourth way of seeking influence, is by popular initiative. Of the 
federations looked at it is only a popular right in Switzerland, where the 
signatures of 100.000 citizens with a right to vote places upon the government 
the obligation to arrange for a referendum on the issue. And in the CT, where 
one million of citizens with a right to vote: “[…] may take the initiative of 
inviting the Commission, within its framework of its powers, to submit any 
appropriate proposal […]” (CT, Art I-47, 4)20. 
 
Table 1 - Channels of influence in the agenda-setting phase / important arenas 
 
 Anglo-Saxon style 
federation 
European 
style 
federation 
1970s-
EEC 
Nice- 
EU 
CT-
EU 
Via member- state 
government 
Yes yes yes yes yes 
Via federal parliament/ 
European Parliament 
Yes yes no partly yes 
Via the federal  
bureaucracy/ EU 
Commission 
Yes yes yes yes yes 
 
 
Summing up, the agenda-setting phase links the problem definition phase and 
the decision making phase; it initiates and prepares an issue for the decision 
making phase. It is characterized by an increasing formalization, but the process 
is still fairly open to actors who are not members of the formal decision making 
institutions. This is the case both in Anglo-Saxon and European style 
federations, as well as in the Nice- and CT-EU. But the ‘federal parliament’ in 
the Nice-EU (European Parliament) lacks the powers of a normal parliament 
esp. the right to initiate legislation. The member states, in the Council of 
Ministers, as well as the Commission are the important actors here. This is also 
the case in the CT-EU parliament, but to a lesser degree, as more policy-
questions now demand the use of the cooperation-procedure, thus giving the EP 
a right to veto and (re-)negotiate the majority of the legislative proposals. In the 
two kinds of federations, European and Anglo-Saxon style, analyzed here the 
federal parliament is equally important. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20  In Switzerland the majority of such popular proposals for referenda on the national level 
have been defeated in the following election, but their influences should not be 
underestimated, as all important legislation is passed with an eye to a possible referendum 
thus ensuring most legislation to be passed in a form perceived acceptable to a majority of 
citizens and cantons. In the same way the CT’s rather weak formulation of ‘inviting the 
Commission’ would possibly be fairly strong in praxis.  
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Braun (in Braun 2000, p. 9) stated that: 
 
Federalism does not only serve as an opportunity structure for interest groups 
and political parties. It also creates new groups of political actors with a 
‘territorial logic’ who enter the political game, these groups being sub-
governments, regional parliaments and bureaucracies. […]  It is worthwhile, 
nevertheless, to stress the different logic these actors have in fulfilling their 
roles in the federal arena. Territorially bound political actors at member state 
level each pursue particularistic interests while sharing a common one in the 
economic affluence and in the reputation of their region, in stable resources, 
in a relevant influence on political decisions as well as in a relatively high 
degree of autonomy relatively to the management of their own affairs. 
 
Such ‘territorial’ tendencies as Braun refers to are found both in the EP and in 
the Council. 
 
 
Decision Making Phase 
This is the phase which we all know both from all analysis of states, inclusive 
the federal states and the EU21, where the media ‘break news’  and the phase on 
which scholars and journalists have concentrated their attention. The 
government / the Commission have made a formal proposal and handed it over 
to the legislative – the federal parliaments with their two chambers and the EU 
with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. This implies serious 
work in parliamentary commissions in federations and in the EU, and in the 
COREPER22 and parliamentary committees of the member states in the EU.  
 
The dual system of the Anglo-Saxon federations, principally segregation of 
federal and member state tasks, as well as the Westminster model of government 
in Canada and Australia, has fostered a tradition of confrontation, instead of 
cooperation; Canada is perhaps the best example of this (Pierson 1995/464). The 
provinces are strong, and look for their rights. Problems come up, when new 
                                                          
21  The EU constellation differs, compared to the two federal types looked at here, in so fare 
as it is the Council of Ministers, in its role as ‘second chamber’ which is the decisive 
actor. The European Parliament, as first chamber, lacks the power of the Council of 
Ministers. But (!)  strong second chambers are not unique in federations e.g. the Senate in 
the US and the German Bundesrat. What constitutes a difference is the strong territorial 
dimension in the Council of Ministers. It is also present in the Senate of the US but not at 
all as outspoken. And concerning Germany, it may be claimed, that it is party policy 
interests which are predominant in the second chamber. This is only the case in the 
Council of Ministers to a minor extend.  
22  COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU-member states in 
Brussels. COREPER is basically a coordination committee, where the Commissions 
proposals are prepare among the member-states representatives on ambassadorial level, 
before they are finally negotiated in the Council of Ministers. 
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policy areas have to be placed: is it a federal or a provincial matter? In Canada it 
is certainly right to talk of ‘inter-governmental’ and not ‘interlocking’ or 
‘cooperative’ federalism; the provincial governments represent themselves in 
negotiations with the federal government (Pierson 1995, p. 465, McKay 2001, p. 
62). As there are no constitutional institutions where federal and member state 
politicians meet, the frequent meetings of the First Ministers Conference are 
very important links between the two levels (the political arena does not play 
this role), the same goes for the other permanent intergovernmental conferences 
as e.g. the Conference of Ministers of Finance and Provincial Treasurers 
(McKay 2001, pp. 51, 56-57, Painter 1991, p. 282). Compared to the US, 
Canada is more centralized, building on the principle that all powers not 
explicitly vested in the member states rest with the federation, this contrary to 
the US and the European style of federations but it is still a fairly decentralized 
federation (McKay 2001, p. 47). The US is also of dual character, but the states 
are less strong and much less coordinated than in Canada, also the state 
governments do not have a genuine possibility to participate in federal 
legislation, as the representatives of the states, the senators, are elected by the 
voters of the individual states, and are not responsible to the state-governments 
(Pierson 1995, pp. 464-5). McKay (2001/, p. 43) goes so fare as to say, that: 
‘Federal and state decision making processes are essentially separated. As a 
result, most of the conflicts between the two levels of government have been 
brokered through the courts’. The territorial dimension has de facto vanished23. 
As a consequence of the lack of official representation, the National Governors’ 
Association tries to influence the federal legislation like an ordinary lobby 
group, and it has its ‘Office of State-Federal Relations’ in Washington DC 
(Grant 2004, p. 265). According to Grant (2004, p. 267), the former executive 
director of the US Advisory Commission on Inter-governmental Relations, John 
Shannon, has described federalism after Ronald Regan as a return of the ‘fend-
for-yourself’ federalism of the old fashioned kind. This is bound to create 
confrontation. 
 
The Australian Senate was designed as a house of the states, where the interests 
of the states could be looked after, but it turned out to be a partisan chamber 
without any genuine territorial affiliation. But there are a number of fora, where 
the federal government meets the member state governments. The oldest, still 
existing is the annual premiers’ conference, where federal and other questions of 
common interest are discussed. But after launching ‘Collaborative Federalism’ 
the federal government has created a ‘Special Premiers’ Conference in 1990, a 
‘Council of State Governments’ in 1992, and a ‘Treaties Council’ in 1996. But 
according to McKay (2001, pp. 73-75) these fora are places to exchange 
information and to consult, not to take decisions, and Prime Minister Howard 
                                                          
23  But the federal government respects the jurisdiction of the states within the federation 
(Agranoff & McGuire 2004, p. 497).   
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preferred to bypass these fora (McKay 2001, p. 75). Thus it does not surprise 
that the relationship between the two levels at times has been very confrontative.  
 
Although the dual systems thrive there is a tendency to more joint decisions 
between the federal and the member state level in the Anglo-Saxon 
federations24. This may over time lead to a decision making culture more like 
the European style.   
 
The policy-making in the European Union is, in the first and decisive phases 
(problem definition, agenda setting) dominated by the European Commission, 
with it legally founded quest for promoting the unification process. In the later 
phases of the policy process (decision-making, implementation) the member-
states are domineering, but depending on the conditions in the individual 
member-state, the following implementation phase again opens for possibilities 
of various actors. 
 
What is important in our case is to emphasize the hyper complexity of the 
decision- making, the constitutional fights among the European institutions on 
the one side and the member-states on the other side, and that the regions play 
their part in this game often as allies of the Commission in its fight for power.25
 
Until the Single European Act all decisions were taken by unanimity, one 
negotiated until consensus was reached. It changed with the Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1987, where Qualified Majority Votes (QMV) was (re-) 
introduced as a means of making decisions. The Nice-EU is still characterized 
by the attempt to reach compromises, and making package-deals compensating a 
member-state in one field if it was disadvantaged in another. But the use of 
QMV in the Council as well as the cooperation procedure in the relationship 
Council – EP has steadily increased, and the CT-EU proposes an increase of 
policy areas where QMV is foreseen in such a way that 80 per cent of the 
policy-areas are under that. A CT-Light Union would be likely to follow the 
same trend due to the high number of member-states, and with more applicants 
waiting to join. But what characterizes both Nice- and CT-EU in the decision 
making phase, as a general rule, is cooperation. Cooperation as the arrangement 
is permanent thus allowing the states to go for absolute gains and not only 
relative ones. 
 
In the European style federations, co-operation also seems to be the rule 
although to different degrees. Swiss federalism is decentralized and of 
cooperative nature; the cantons are strong, and they cooperate among 
                                                          
24  Cf. Agranoff & McGuier (2004), Saunders (2002), Selway (2001). Beattie, primer of 
Queensland, denies this development (2002).   
25 For a detailed discussion of the EU decision making system, see Dosenrode 1997. 
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themselves and with the government in many ways i.e. in the conference of the 
cantonal governments, in the various ‘directors conferences’26, where they try to 
reach a consensus when replying the governments law-proposals, or through the 
many inter-cantonal agreements (Konkordate). At the federal level the cantons 
are represented in the State Council, Ständerat, with two representatives from 
each canton. But the members of the State Council are elected by public vote in 
the individual cantons, and are not subject to instructions from the cantonal 
government27. These members of the Ständerat are of course cantonal 
representatives, and do have an eye on the interests of their respective cantons 
but votes are primarily cast in compliance with ideological and national 
considerations. In all matters concerning the cantons the federal government, 
Bundesrat, has to consult the cantons, Vernehmlassungsverfahren, before 
proposing legislation, and in all larger matters, e.g. taxation, a law can first enter 
into force when it has been subject to a referendum, in which a majority of 
citizens and of cantons have voted in favor. Thus the cantons are protected 
against a strong executive by a variety of veto points and this forces the federal 
government to seek cooperation. Additionally, the cantons may themselves 
initiate federal law by sending a proposal to the Parliament. The territorial 
aspect of the decision-making process is present and visible (e.g. the French-
speaking cantons and the German speaking cantons often have different 
interests).  
 
In Germany and Austria one also see a pattern of cooperation, but on a different 
basis. German federalism has been called ‘centralized cooperative federalism’ 
(cf. McKay 2001, p. 93), and it is characterized by close cooperation between 
the two levels; the federal reform of 2006 has not changed that. The German 
members of the second chamber of the federal parliament, the Bundesrat, are 
members of the governments of the Bundesländer. Thus the member state 
governments participate directly in the legislative process in Berlin on policy-
issues related to them, and the second chamber has a veto-power towards the 
first chamber28. But the second chamber behaves according to an ideological 
logic, not – or seldom – out of a territorial one. This implies that cooperation is 
less outspoken, when the first chamber, Bundestag, and second chamber are 
ruled by different parties (cf. Lehmbruch 1978, p. 151). This was one of the 
reasons, to launch respective re-launch the federal reform process in autumn 
                                                          
26  The ‘directors’ are members of the cantonal governments in their dual capacity as 
ministers and administrative heads (‘directors’). They meet according to topic, like the EU 
Council of Ministers. They can meet in political / geographically determined groups or all 
of them. The purpose is to discuss problems of common interest including responses to 
federal law-proposals. 
27  Switzerland is a cooperative i.e. European style federalism (Frenkel 1984, p. 112, Krisie 
1995, p. 56 and Wältli & Bullinger 2001, p. 78). 
28     In other words the second chamber mixes the legislative and the executive powers. 
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2005; to prevent the second chamber with an opposite majority than the first 
chamber, to be able to stop or prolong the legislation process. But that was not 
the result (Scharpf 2006)29. The Bundesrat has a veto right, but this right is used 
scarcely. A lot of coordination between the two levels take place; at the federal 
government level and the Bundesländer have considerably influence on the 
policy-outcome (one talks of Politikverflechtung or ‘interlocking federalism’ 
(Scharpf et al. 1976 & 1977, McKay 2001, p. 92)). The problem being, that the 
policy-results are sub-optimal. (Scharpf et al. 1976, p. 236)30. Concretely do the 
Prime Ministers, Ministerpräsidenten, meet four times a year to coordinate 
positions, and on a rotating basis does one Bundesland after the other has the 
presidency and act as secretariat. Twice a year the Prime Ministers meet the 
Bundeskanzler after their own meeting. Additionally do the ministers in charge 
meet e.g. to discuss traffic or environmental questions. As the members of the 
state governments also meet in the Second Chamber of the parliament, the 
coordination works well. 
 
Austria is a strongly centralized federation (Drummond 2002, p. 43)31. The 
member state parliaments elect representatives to the second chamber, the 
Bundesrat, but contrary to Germany, the opposition parties must be represented, 
too (B-VG Art. 35). This implies that the second chamber always has been 
divided ideologically and not been able to be a strong opponent to the first 
chamber. Also the heads of the member state governments, the 
Landeshauptmänner, have a right to participate in all the negotiations of the 
second chamber (B-VG Art. 36). The territorial aspect may be detected, but the 
main variable is party-affiliation, and the second chamber is, as indicated, fairly 
week. As in Switzerland and Germany the member states coordinate their 
positions towards law-proposals from the government. Coordination takes place 
at governmental level in various permanent conferences (the most important the 
one of the Landeshauptläute) and at civil servant level. A very important 
institution is the ‘Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer’ (Agency of the member 
states) which maintains the contact to the federal government and conduct the 
practical coordination of the member states opinions (Klöte & Dosenrode 1994). 
In spite of this excellent system of coordination, the influence of the member 
states on the decision making at the federal level is limited32. The main actors 
are the national, political parties and the arena is the first chamber of the federal 
parliament. But still cooperation is the hallmark both in Germany and Austria. 
                                                          
29  An other purpose was to minimise the ‘interlocking’ structure. That, too, failed (Scharpf 
2006). 
30  Wachendorpher-Schmidt (2000, p. 8) acknowledges the influence of Scharpf et al.s 
theory, but contrasts it with the theory of dynamic federalism of Hesse & Benz. 
31  A trend against the centralization began with the preparation for an Austrian EU-
membership, se below. 
32  Interviews in Vienna, June 2006. 
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The participation of the second level in the federal EU-decision making  
A special case for Austria and Germany is the increased participation of the 
member state level in the formulation of the federal EU-policy (cf. Klöti & 
Dosenrode 1994, Dosenrode 1995).  Germany is the oldest federal member of 
the EU, and the question of the Bundesländers participation foreign policy has 
been discussed since the Lindauer-agreement of 1957, but until the Mastricht-
treaty the influence of the member states on the shaping of Germanys EU-policy 
was small (cf. Müller 1993; Zuleeg 1992). The SEA had given the member 
states the right to give a binding recommendation to the federal government on 
EC-proposals falling solely within the competences of the second level, and the 
federal government would have to follow it. With Maastricht this right was 
incorporated into the German constitution, together with the right that new EC-
treaties would have to pass the second chamber with 2/3 majority to be ratified 
(Art 23 GG). As with Austria and Belgium, the member states send 
representatives to the Council of Regions33. During the negotiations for Austrian 
EU-membership the federal government needed to change parts of the 
constitution, and that could only be done with the accept of the member states. 
This was the opportunity the second level had waited for in the centralized 
federation. An agreement was eventually struck, but a senior civil servant in the 
prime ministers office called the behavior of the member states ‘pure 
blackmail’34. The Austrian Länder got an agreement very much like the German 
one, but they also managed to get rid of an institution, the intermediate federal 
administration ‘Mittelbare Bundesverwaltung’ at the same time, or at least they 
thought so35. The heads of the Länder had had to act as federal authority in 
certain situations, what often lead to uncertainty and definitely undermined the 
independence of the member states. In the German agreement, which was a 
model of the Austrian, concerning the participation of the second level in the 
federal levels EU-policy making, it was the member state governments and the 
federal governments who should cooperate. The Austrian member state 
governments expected the same to be the case in Austria, but not so the member 
state parliaments. After a long and heated discussion one made the compromise, 
that both parliament and government should participate in the discussions, and 
that it was the head of the state government who should present an eventual 
decisions (Dosenrode 1995, p. 152). This model corresponds to the Danish EU-
decision making model, where the Parliament has a strong say before the 
government negotiates in Brussels (Dosenrode 2003b). The federal government 
                                                          
33  This direct involvement of the Länder in the negotiations in Brussels has never been 
popular with the federal authorities who, in vain, tried to have it removed during the 
negotiations leading to the German federal reform. 
34  In conversation with the author. 
35   In reality it has remained. An senior official told the author, that maintaining it is very        
convenient for the Landeshauptläute, when they have difficult or unplessant decision to 
make ‘my hands are tight by Vienna’ they can say (Interview in Vienna, June 2006). 
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is bound to follow the recommendation of the states unless vital, national 
interests are at stake (Dosenrode 1995, p. 153). 
 
Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, did the preparations for a 
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) give the cantons new rights. 
Foreign policy is basically a federal prerogative in Switzerland as in most 
states36. But as the EEA in many ways would interfere with the competences of 
the cantons, the cantonal governments demanded a right of participation. The 
federal government suggested a right to get informed (Botschaft 1992), but that 
was unacceptable. The federal parliament intervened on the side of the cantons, 
and the federal government was instructed a) to inform the cantons early and in 
depth, and b) to include the cantons in the preparation of the negotiations and 
the decision making (Hänni 1993, p. 28). As a consequence the cantons created 
the Conference of the Cantonal governments’ to strengthen their position 
towards the federal government and the result was that the rights of the cantons 
to be informed and included in the foreign policy of Switzerland was laid down 
in the new constitutions (articles 54 and 55), although the Swiss people and a 
majority of cantons eventually voted ‘no’ to a membership of the EEA. Thus the 
EU has strengthened the cantonal cooperation in general, and the cantons 
position towards the federal government in particular.  
 
The European integration process has strengthened the position of the member 
states in the federations both due to constitutional rights, but also because the 
member states are included officially in the EU-decision making process 
(through the Council of Regions), through the Regional policy of the EU, and 
because many member states maintain ‘representations’ in Brussels with the task 
of gathering relevant information an of doing lobbying (this is also the case for 
the regions in the centralized states cf. Dosenrode & Halkier 2003). But it has 
also added a European dimension to the governance of the member states, 
giving it a broader, less provincial style. 
 
Summing up, the decision making culture and processes are distinctively 
different when looking at the Anglo-Saxon style federations on the one hand and 
the European style federations including the EU on the other hand (see able 
below).  
 
Table 2 Style of cooperation 
 
 Anglo-Saxon style federation European  
style federation 
 
Nice- EU CT-EU 
 
 
Cooperation style Confrontation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 
                                                          
36  But ‘Volk und Stände’ (people and cantons) must be heard in a referendum before 
Switzerland can ratify certain international treaties, and certain ‘low foreign policy’ areas 
are left for the cantons.  
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In the Anglo-Saxon federations it is appropriate to talk of inter-governmental 
relations between the two levels. Especially in Canada and Australia, but also in 
the US, the member states are basically excluded from the federal decision-
making; there are more or less formal committees with representatives from 
both levels but they are of advisory character. Disagreements are taken to the 
federal court. The European federations, including both the Nice- and the CT-
EU are characterized by state-involvement in the decision-making phase (the 
strongest in the EU and Germany, the weakest in Austria). Disagreements are 
taken to the federal court / European Court of Justice, but due to the cooperative 
tradition and the involvement of both levels, compromises are normal … esp. in 
the EU37. 
 
 
Implementation phase 
The parliament has decided upon a policy, and now it has to be implemented. As 
it has been noted is implementation not a simple thing, as Pressmand & 
Wildavsky made it clear already in the sub-title of their 1973 book: ‘How big 
expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland’38. No public policy is 
implemented by itself, there always has to a responsible institution, and all 
institutions have interests. If one adds that implementation is fairly uninteresting 
for politicians – unless the implementation goes wrong and media finds out – , 
and that implementation in reality involves many actors from the public and 
private sphere, it is obvious that this phase leaves ample space for ‘adjustments’ 
and ‘corrections’ for the agent who implements the policy (Dosenrode 2003, p. 
396)39. 
 
The Anglo-Saxon dual-system style implies that in principle the laws decided up 
on by the federal parliament are implemented by federal agencies without 
intermediary between the federation and the addressee be that citizens, firms or 
organizations. The states are not involved in the process40. Reality looks a bit 
different. The two tiers of government do exist, with each their agencies 
responsible for the implementation of the federal respectively the state 
legislation. But in all federations exists a number of concurrent and joint policy-
                                                          
37  But of cause the EC / EU has had its crisis’ too; one only has to think of president de 
Gaulle in the late 1960s and the split over support to the US lead invasion of Iraq 2003. 
After all, politics is about sharing limited resources. 
38  This is not the place to discuss the problems of implementation. In the vast literature on 
the topic one can recommend a few classics: Windhof-Herietie (1987); Wayne Parsons 
(1995); Paul A. Sabatier (1986). Kenneth Hanf & Theo Toonen (1985) explicitly discusses 
the complexity of implementation, and the involvement of various actors.  
39   To be fair one has to say that if politicians should use time on supervising implementation 
and evaluation a very large extra burden would be placed on them. 
40  In all federations exists a number of concurrent and joint policy-areas or programs, but we 
try to distil the ‘arch types’ in this paper, as mentioned before. 
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areas or programs; Painter (2000, p. 135) puts it like this: ‘Australia, like 
Canada, is a “mixed” system, where co-ordinate parliamentary governments 
share overlapping functions, and are forced to co-operate while seeking to 
preserve arm’s length existence’. According to Selway (2001, pp. 117-119) the 
fiscal imbalance, where the states depend economically upon the 
Commonwealth (the Australian federation), has made them very dependent; the 
Commonwealth has become the primary source of policy-making. And the 
Commonwealth has supported this development. Not surprisingly the 
Commonwealth has used its own agents to implement federal legislation, but not 
very successfully: 
 
It is now clear that those arrangements [federal agencies, SD] do not provide 
sufficient policy oversight. They also fragment the overall role of government 
n delivering services. It is also clear that the use of statutory authorities does 
not ensure efficiency (Selway 2001, p. 121). 
 
The same is the case in the US (Chun and Rainey 2005, p. 23). The demand for 
cooperation often comes from the federal state; some times in the way that the 
Congress passes a bill obliging the states to implement (and pay) a certain 
policy. This procedure of course creates frictions between the two levels (Grant 
2004, p. 269). Grant refers to federal ‘black mail’ concerning implementation 
e.g. as the federal government under Regan (who otherwise tried to strengthen 
the states) decided to demand from the states, that persons under 21 should not 
be allowed to purchase alcohol, as a way to stop drunk driving  among young 
people. The states not complying would loose their highway grants from the 
federal government (2004, p. 270). In this way the federal government is fairly 
sure of state cooperation. But it is worth noting that the federal government in 
the US has not been allowed to expand like the one in Australia. According to 
Agranoff & McGuire (2004, pp. 498-9) the Congress has always been careful 
not to let the executive accumulate power, and: ‘The United States has never had 
a prefectural tradition, with the use of tutelage or priori approval power by the 
central state administration over local decisions’ (ibid p. 499).  
 
Canada may be the federation closest to the arch-type Anglo-Saxon style 
federation: 
 
The principles underlying the Canadian division of power are based on 
jurisdictional distinctions between various subject matters. The result is a 
system of parallel rather than interlocking governments with each government 
each asserting the right of unilateral action in its separate jurisdictions (Painter 
1991, p. 274). 
 
Concerning implementation, Painter mentions that when the federal government 
is dependent on the provinces cooperation, they may be bad off (1991, p. 282): 
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‘[…] a recalcitrant provincial government may be able to nullify the 
implementation in question’, and ‘It [the provincial government, SD] might 
deliberately ignore grant conditions, or make reductions in provincial allocations 
to programs which new grants are aiming to argument’.  But the federal 
government is not dependent on the provinces alone as it has its federal 
agencies, too (Skogstadt 2000/63). But the implementation by the federal 
agencies is not perfect, as Skogstadt shows (2000, pp. 72-75). 
 
The Anglo-Saxon federations have, in principle, opted for implementation of 
federal law through federal agenesis occasionally creating parallel systems of 
implementation e.g. of courts and police forces as in the US. This gives the 
federal government a direct control of the implementation, in principle, and 
preserves its independence of the states. It also implies the danger of waste of 
resources as two organizations treats nearly the same cases; there is a risk of 
rivalries over competencies, and the risk that the central government does not 
know what actually happens at the street level, due to the distance. 
 
In European style federations, the states are involved closely in the decision 
making process, and thus are expected to share the aim of a policy. This is 
important, when a policy has to be implemented. Scharpf (cited by Braun 2003, 
p. 13) puts it like: 
 
This is why the ‘capacity to coordinate’ is likewise important in order to 
understand the degree of constraint federal structures are causing in federal 
policy-making. If member states are integrated into federal fiscal policy 
decisions, the likelihood of effective implementation rises. The potential of 
coordination depends on two variables: on the one hand on the availability of 
institutions for coordination and, on the other hand, on the ‘interaction 
orientation’ of actors when ‘playing the game’, i.e. if actors resort to a more 
competitive or a more consensus orientation. 
 
Discretion given to the states in the implementation will in the ideal world 
secure, that the policy will get implemented optimally though not alike in each 
state; in a less ideal world discretion or delegation implies a lot of opportunities 
for the state to circumvent the federal government’s policy aim, when 
implementing the policy.  
 
The German Constitution contains a general implementation clause in Article 30 
GG in which the Bundesländer are responsible for the implementation of federal 
legislation – and actually the Bundesländer were directly involved in the making 
of this legislation through the Bundesrat. Thus it is reasonable to expect a 
certain loyalty in the implementation, unless of course a member state is ruled 
by a government, which is in opposition in the upper house of the federal 
parliament... But it is possible for the federal government to issue ‘general 
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administrative rules’ (allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschriften), to ensure either 
uniform implementation or implementation at all. But the federal government 
may only issue those with the accept of the upper house (Weber 1980, p. 113).  
 
Contrary to Germany, the Swiss constitution does not have a general 
implementation clause. The decision on which level should implement 
legislation is laid down in the law itself. But Kissling-Näf and Wälti (1999, p. 
655) go so fare as to claim, that  in reality one may speak of an institutionalized 
praxis, where the federal level (Bundesversamlung) legislate, and the cantonal 
implements; this is what is meant, when describing Swiss federalism as 
‘implementation-federalism’: 
 
The logic of the implementation-federalism to-day, guarantees not only that 
the cantons are leading during the implementation, but also that they 
legitimate it and have an important word to speak already during the policy 
formulation (Kissling-Näf and Wälti 1999, p. 655). 
 
Austrian federalism is, as mentioned, rather centralized. But the constitution, the 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Art. 11, B-VG, and partly Art. 12), does give the 
Länder a right of implementation and administration41. The federation (Bund) 
only has a limited right of supervision over the implementation (Weber 1980, p. 
115). 
 
Whereas the European Commission plays the central role in the two first stages 
of the European Union’s policy-making cycle, and an important role in the third, 
its role in the forth phase, implementation, is minim42. ‘Implementation’ in EU-
language differs a bit from the common usage. In EU-terms ‘implementations’ 
means that the directive has been transformed into national (member-state) law, 
whereas it normally implies, that the policy has been put into effect what is 
something quit different. The vast majority of the implementation is done by the 
states, and that is no coincidence43. First of all the implementation is a source of 
influence; second, it is reasonable to let the national administrations, which 
know the national circumstances best, be in charge of the implementations of 
European directives, and third it would demand a lot of resources to build up 
EU-implementation agencies – an expense there was and is no political will to 
accommodate to. This implementation principle is laid down in the treaties: the 
Nice and CT-EU Treaties (Art. 249 resp. Art. I-33) place the responsibility for 
the implementation of directives (in CT-terminology ‘a European frame law’, 
Art. I-33) with the member states. Thus the European Commission relies heavily 
                                                          
41  The catalogue of competencies in the Austrian constitution, including the question of who 
implements what, is a frightful mess. 
42  Exceptions are i.a. rules concerning fisheries and agriculture. 
43  A short look trough the sparse literature on implementation in the EU, from Siendetopf & 
Zillre (1988), over From & Stave (1993), to Peters (2000) tell the same story.  
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on the member-states when directives have to be implemented (From & Stava in 
Andersen & Eliassen 1993)44.  
 
The right to implement and to control the implementation means influence to the 
one doing it. All together, the state level has strong means of influence 
concerning the actual way federal legislation is working – or not working – in 
the European style of federalism contrary to the Anglo-Saxon one. But 
implementation is more than a question of power; it is also a question of 
practicality. If the starting-point is an agreement on the end result between the 
federal government and the state-governments, decentralized implementation 
may ensure the working of the policy in occasionally very different 
environments like Hamburg and Bavaria in Germany, or St. Gallen and Geneva 
in Switzerland, because the state governments know how things work in their 
part of the country. But when this is said, one also has to remember that the 
implementation phase is dull seen with a politician’s eyes; the battle is fought, 
the bargain is made and new things are waiting. Thus the executive of the states, 
the civil servants and interest organizations are left with rather free hands. This 
is even more so within the EU. The Union hardly has any implementing 
agencies, and it is lied down in the present treaty, as well as in the CT that 
implementation is the responsibility of the states. Discussions with 
representatives of the EU-member states in Brussels have confirmed to the 
author, that the role of implementer is considered crucial for the member states, 
not only to secure the best possible implementation, but also due to the power-
perspective. The Unions member-states are the essential and constituting units in 
the EU, and they are not interested in changing the ‘balance of power’ between 
the states and the institutions. In this respect, there is a clear parallel to the US 
Congress’ attitude towards the American presidency, as mentioned above. But 
this parallel does not reach far, as the logic of the Anglo-Saxon style calls for the 
creation of federal agencies to implement federal laws, and state agencies to 
implement state law. The two federal styles clearly create different institutions 
and processes45. 
 
Table 3 Implementation 
 
 Anglo-Saxon ideal 
style federation 
 
European ideal style 
federation 
Nice- EU CT-EU 
Who implements 
federal 
legislation? 
Dual systems; each 
level has its own 
agencies 
Cooperative  system: 
The member states 
implement for the 
federal level 
Cooperative system: 
The member states 
implement for the EU 
level 
Cooperative 
system: The 
member states 
implement for the 
EU level 
                                                          
44  A good, short, introduction is Cini (Cini 2003, pp. 384-364).  
45  But one may expect the Anglo-Saxon style of implementation to change towards the 
European one as the complexity of the policy processes grow and the uncertainty 
concerning at which level to place a new policy area rises, too.  
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Evaluation, Reformulation, Termination 
Although one could expect the fifth phase, the policy-evaluation46 and perhaps 
reformulation or termination to be a very busy phase, this is rarely the case47.  
 
The stagiest concept may imply policy-making to be rational, and one could 
foresee the following to happen: a through policy-evaluation, and depending on 
its results, a policy adaptation, a policy change or a policy termination. But that 
is not the norm. There are a number of factors influencing a policy evaluation 
and re-formulation: a) the federal government need information on how the 
policy works to be able to act; b) there must be a political will to make a change 
if necessary; c) the possibilities for change depend on the style of federation; and 
d) it is an advantage if the involved bureaucracy is willing to make a change if 
necessary48. On could expect a court of auditors to be of value in this case, but 
they rarely look into the subject matter it self.  
 
In the typical Anglo-Saxon federation, the federal government is responsible for 
the implementation of the federal legislation through its agencies. Thus from a 
top-down perspective the federal government should be able to find out how its 
policies are working at the street-level, simply by using its agencies, but it also 
has secondary sources such as mass-media and unsatisfied citizens and interest 
organizations. Should it turn out in the way, that change are necessary and that 
the federal government is willing to suggest it, it  will be a federal matter 
involving the federal government and parliament. The weak spot is of course the 
collaboration between the federal government and parliament on the one hand, 
and the federal bureaucracy on the other, as it is in all states. The bureaucracies 
may work against a change a) due to a loss of prestige, b) because it will cost 
extra work but not necessarily extra resources, c) due to an unwillingness to 
change etc. 
 
In the European style federations things are not as apparently easy as in the 
Anglo-Saxon ones. To begin with the federal government does not have its own 
agencies with civil servants to report back to it. The federal government is 
dependent on the states’ reports, mass-media and unsatisfied citizens and 
interest organizations to get an idea of how a policy is working. In other words 
its sources for feed-back or evaluation is limited compared to the Anglo-Saxon 
federation. Should it turn out in the way that a policy-reformulation or 
termination would be advisable and that the federal government indented to do 
so, it may encounter more difficulties than a federal government in an Anglo-
                                                          
46  In ‘real life’ evaluation in some cases runs parallel to the policy-implementation.  
47  To this author’s knowledge empirical analysis of this policy-phase is lacking, thus this 
part has a sketchy character. A comparative project on the topic is planed by this author 
for 2007-2008. 
48  Bureaucratic politics theory as well as principal-agent theory point to this problem. 
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Saxon federation. This is so due to the fact that the states have a large number of 
veto-points. The piece of legislation which needs re-formulation or termination 
may be the result of a larger deal, involving compromising over several issues, 
implying that a change of one policy-issue may demand the change of other 
issues as well. If one then consider the possibility of a changed representation in 
the second chamber it becomes obvious that policy-changes are difficult. But the 
states are acting within a fairly coherent political culture negotiating on a 
national basis.  
 
The European Union could be seen as an archetype European federation 
concerning policy-reformulation. Reformulation of policy brings up the 
permanent problem of finding a new compromise for the 27 member-states, as 
in the European style federations, just more extreme, as a common political 
culture as well as common identity is not as developed as in the federations; 
territorial or national interests still play an important role. In addition, the not 
unimportant bureaucratic resistance to change an already implemented 
procedure has to be overcome in the Commissions bureaucracy. The experience 
of national civil servants from Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany 
is that due to the Commission's very rigid understanding of rules, correction of 
regulations seldom takes place (interview Nov. 1995, and December 2004)49. 
This all speaks against radical changes. Thus one can consider the reformulation 
of EU-policy a rather challenging exercise unless a dramatic occurrence 
happens, such as the disgraceful departure as the Sander Commission, which led 
to evaluation and reformulation of several EU-policies and practices. 
 
 
Table 4 Policy-evaluation and reformulation 
 
 
 
Anglo-Saxon 
ideal style 
federation 
European ideal style 
federation 
 
Nice- EU CT-EU 
Responsible 
for 
Evaluation / 
Policy-
reformulation 
The federal 
government & 
parliament 
The federal 
government  & 
parliament, and the 
states governments 
and parliaments 
The European 
Commission, the EP the 
Council of Ministers, the 
Member – states 
governments & 
parliaments 
The European 
Commission, the EP the 
Council of Ministers, the 
Member – states 
governments & 
parliaments 
 
If the above mentioned sounds pessimistic, concerning rational evaluation, 
eventual reformulation or termination, it fits neatly into the findings of the 
policy-analysis approach. The evaluation-theory has a whole range of 
instruments and approaches at its disposal … in theory (Parsons 1995, pp. 542-
                                                          
 49 In a rather old interview, Prof. John Toy, University of Sussex, stressed the same 
observation, stating in Danish Radio (P1), 27.2.1996, 18.10, that the rigidity of the EU-
system prevented changes, although one recognized that the procedures were 
unsatisfactory.  
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568), but as sketched above are there a number of difficulties applying them. 
And if a result should be produced, the chances that it will carry great 
importance in a policy-reformulation are small. Parsons quote Rossi and 
Freeman for writing (1995, p. 569): 
 
An evaluation is only one ingredient in a political process of balancing 
interests and coming to decisions. The evaluator’s role is close to that of an 
expert witness, furnishing the best information possible under the 
circumstances; it is not the role of the judge and jury. 
 
This does of course not imply that evaluations are unnecessary or even 
impossible, but simply that their role is limited and that changes are difficult. 
And as already indicated may a policy change or even termination be a tough 
matter. Policies, once made, tend to go on for ever. Prestige and energy has been 
invested in promoting, deciding and later implement them. When implemented, 
a policy-program rests with a certain agency which often develops ownership 
towards it, all of this securing a policy a long life. But this does of course not 
mean that policies do not change at all; they do as already indicated. First of all, 
most policies leave the bureaucracy – from the top to street-level bureaucrat - 
space for adjusting it, and this happens recalling Pressman and Wildawsky’s 
subtitle quoted above, just not always in the way the legislator intended to50. 
And here comes, second, an important way of changing, re-formulating or 
terminating policies: through the Supreme Court respectively the European 
Court of Justice. 
 
The Supreme Court has the possibility either by it self or when complained to, to 
scrutinize a legal act to see if it is in accordance with the federal constitution or 
is implemented correctly.  If it is not, the federal or state parliament will have to 
change it respectively its praxis. It does not look as if there is a dividing line 
between the European style and the Anglo-Saxon style federations as to the 
activity of their Supreme Courts in the law making or law revising process; Both 
the American Supreme Court, the Australian High Court51 and the European 
Court of Justice are very active, where as, the Austrian, the Canadian, the 
German and the Swiss Supreme Courts seem more reluctant in comparison. 
 
A general characteristic for all the federations analyzed here is that evaluation 
happens, to a smaller or larger extend, but that politically decided reformulation 
or termination are hard to make happen under normal political circumstances but 
internal or external pressure facilitates such changes. Still, policy-change or 
termination is easier done in Anglo-Saxon federations than in European style 
                                                          
50  This is not the place to discuss the important question of legitimacy. 
51  See Selway and Williams (2005) for an interesting analysis of the Australian High Courts 
role in building the federation. 
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federations, and next to impossible in the EU (the CT or a CT-Light are not 
likely to change this). 
 
 
Making Policy in Federations and in the EU 
Using the policy cycle approach, though taking it with a grin of salt, has 
structured our way through the policy-making process in a number of European 
and Anglo-Saxon federations as well as the EU52. The main conclusion can be 
summarized in three points: First, there are distinct, different styles of the 
federal policy-processes in European federations vs. the Anglo-Saxon ones; not 
so much in the problem-definition phase, as in the following phases, where the 
amount of actors, as well as the inclusion of the state level varies considerably. 
The amount of actors is considerably smaller in the Anglo-Saxon federations 
than in the European ones. Also the degree of inclusion of the states in the 
federal decision-making is higher in the European style federations53. The main 
explanation of the differences between the Anglo-Saxon style federations and 
the European style including the EU is the institutional set up and the working 
habits they lead to. And this must be looked at in a historic and cultural context. 
In the figure below one does see the clear difference between the two kinds of 
federations; but what does that matter? Braun (2003, p. 13) asks the same 
question like this: 
 
One can hypothesise that the power sharing type of federalism [European 
style, SD] will show a large capacity to coordinate but a low capacity to act 
on the part of the federal government while the power separating type [the 
Anglo-Saxon style, SD] grants sufficient freedom to federal governments, 
though of limited scope, but with a possibly underdeveloped capacity to 
coordinate. 
 
The analysis’ in this chapter shows that exactly this is the case. This raises the 
questions of efficiency, which again has to be related to the question of 
legitimacy. But that discussion must wait. The important conclusions here are 
that there are significant differences between the Anglo-Saxon style federations 
on the one side, and the European style on the other, and that the EU in its Nice-
form as well as in the CT-form constitutes a variation of the European-style. 
 
The policy-process, secondly, in the European Union does resemble that of the 
European style federations, especially in the later policy-phases where the 
member-states to a very high degree are included in the process. This hardly 
                                                          
52  This is not the place to evaluate the approach, but in author’s opinion, it has been useful. 
53  It is tempting to hypothesize that the quality of legislation made in a system with many 
veto-points is lower than in systems with few veto-points. On the other hand large 
inclusion may give legislation a higher degree of legitimation than in a system with a 
lower degree of inclusion. 
 25
surprises, as the EU (European Coal and Steel Community) was envisaged by it 
founding fathers as a federation in being on the one hand, and as the Union 
consists of member-states who share a common core-culture but have each their 
own history which speaks against a unitary ‘construction’ on the other hand. The 
states are important actors in the European style federation (with Austria as a 
possible exception), but not as important as the member-states in the EU, where 
e.g. one member-state  is able to block changes in the ‘constitution’54 as one saw 
it with France and the Netherlands and the CT in 2005. The EU-member states 
play a central role especially in the decision-making phase compared to 
‘traditional’ European states in federations. This is enhanced by the growing, 
role of the European Parliament as the ‘first chamber’, although its role hardly 
matches that of a traditional first chamber in European federations (but se the 
table below)55. The compatibility of the policy-making style of the EU and the 
European-style federation must be assumed to give the EU sustainability as it 
does not constitute an alien element to the member-states governmental culture.  
 
                                                          
54  It has been argued that the acquis commenautaire constitutes a de facto constitution for 
the EU. A paper called ‘constitution’ is not necessary in it self, the United Kingdom is a 
good example. 
55  When this is said, this paper also clearly indicates that systematic comparative studies are 
needed within this field.  
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Table 5: Principle actors / level in the various phases of the federal policy making 
process  
 
 
 Anglo-Saxon style 
federations 
European style 
federations 
 
Nice-EU CT-EU 
Problem-
definition 
All incl. member-
state level 
All incl. federal 
level 
All incl. member-state 
level, but emphasize 
on federal level (EU-
Commission) 
All incl. member-state 
level, but emphasize 
on federal level (EU-
Commission) 
 
Agenda-setting 
 
All incl. member-
state level, but 
emphasize on 
federal level actors 
All incl. federal 
actors, but 
emphasis on 
member-state 
level 
EU-Commission, 
Member states 
through the European 
Council 
Council of Ministers 
EU-Commission, 
Member states 
through the European 
Council 
Council of Ministers 
 
Decision-
making 
Federal level 
actors 
Federal & 
member state 
level, but 
emphasize on 
federal level 
 
Federal & member-
states, but emphasize 
on member-states 
Federal & member-
states, but emphasize 
on member-states 
Implementation Federal level Member-state 
level 
Member-state level Member-states level 
 
Policy- 
Evaluation/ 
Reformulation/ 
Termination 
Federal level Federal & 
member-state 
level 
Federal level & 
Member-state level 
(low activity) 
Federal level & 
Member-state level 
(low activity) 
 
 
 
Tiredly, the CT or a possible CT-Light would possibly strengthen the federal 
character already present in the Nice-EU in so fare as they would add new 
policy-areas to the area covered by the co-decision procedure. The co-decision 
procedure grants the EP a number of possibilities to influence EU-legislation by 
either rejecting it, by a majority of its members, and thus stop it, or by proposing 
amendments. The latter opens for a series of possibilities for the EP to amend 
and change the original proposal which it does frequently. Also the CT itself 
was drafted over the federal last, as one could read in the earlier versions from 
the European Convent, before it was removed from the final text: one could also 
mention the listing of competencies, the (weak) presidency of the European 
Council, the EU foreign minister etc. In general, the original CT would remove 
the question of the nature of the EU, as its already existing statehood would be 
clear to anyone. Seen from an academic point of view this would make life 
easier, but the same is seemingly not the case for the majority of the European 
political elite. 
 
 
 27
References 
 
Agranoff, Robert (2004) ‘JPART Symposium Introduction – Researching Intergovernmental 
Relations’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 14, No. 4. 
Agranoff, Robert & Michael McGuire (2004) ‘Another Look at Bargaining and Negotiating 
in Intergovernmental Management’, Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, Vol. 14, No. 4. 
Andersen, Svein S. & Kjell A. Eliasen (eds.) (1993) Making Policy in Europe, London: 
SAGE. 
Beattie, Peter (2002) ‘The Immediate Challenge Regarding COAG Reform’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 61, No. 4. 
Bowman, Ann O’M. (2004) ‘Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate Interactions’, 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 14, No. 4. 
Botschaft zur Genehmigung des Abkommens über den Europäischens Wirtschaftsraumes 
vom 18. Mai 1992, S I/543 (Swiss government); abbreviated: Botschaft 1992. 
Branner, Hans & Morten Kelstrup (2003), Denmark’s Policy Towards Europe After 1945, 2. 
ed., University Press of Southern Denmark 
Braun, Ditmar (ed.) (2000) Public Policy and Federalism, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Braun, Ditmar (2000a) ‘Territorial Division of Power and Public Polucy-Making: An 
overview’, in Ditmar Braun (ed.) Public Policy and Federalism, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Braun, Ditmar (2000b) ‘The Territorial Division of Power in Comparative Public Policy 
Research: An Assessment’, in Ditmar Braun (ed.), Public Policy and Federalism, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Braun, Ditmar (2003) Fiscal Policies in Federal States, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Chun, Han Young & Hall G. Rainey (2005) ‘Goal Ambiguity in U.S. Federal Agencies’, 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 15, No. 1.  
Cini, Michelle (2003) European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burns, Charlotte (2004) ‘Codecision and the Europran Commission: a study in declining 
influence?’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 1 
Dosenrode, Søren (1995) ‘Going NUTS – amter, delstater og kantoner i Europa’,  Nordisk 
Administrativt Tidsskrift, Vol. 76, No. 2. 
Dosenrode, Søren (1997) ‘Networks in Danish EU-Policy-Making’, Series of Occasional 
Papers, No. 20, European Research Unit, Aalborg University. 
Dosenrode, Søren (2002) ‘Dänemark - Dezentralisierter Einheitsstaat in einer Föderation’ 
Europäiaches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen: Jahrbuch des 
Föderalismus, Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Dosenrode, Søren (2003a) ‘The EUropean State’,  Uwe Serdült & Thomas Widmer, Politik 
im Fokus, Zürich: NZZ Verlag.  
Dosenrode, Søren (2003b) ‘Danish EU-Policy Making’, in Branner, Hans & Morten Kelstrup 
(eds.) (2003) Denmark’s Policy Towards Europe After 1945, 2. ed., University Press of 
Southern Denmark. 
Dosenrode, Søren (2007) Approaching the EUropean Federation, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Dosenrode, Søren & Niels Christian Sidenius (1999) Lobbyisme i EU, Århus: Systime.  
Dosenrode & Halkier (eds.) (2003) Nordic Regions and the European Union, Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Drummond, Mark (2002) ‘Costing Constitutional Change – Esimating the Costs of Five 
Variations on Australia’s Federal System’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
Vol. 61, No. 4. 
Eising, Rainer (2003) ‘Interest groups and the European Union’, in Michelle Cini (ed.) 
European Union Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 28
Elazar, Daniel J. (1991) Federal Systems of the World, A handbook of federal, confederal and 
autonomu arrangements, Harlow, UK: Longman. 
EU-oplysningens arbejdsdokument – Foreløbig, uofficiel udgave (2004), Traktaten Om En 
Forfatning For Europa, version 4 af 25. august.  
Everett, Sophia (2003)‘The Policy Cycle – Democratic Process or Rational Paradigm 
Revisited?’, Australian Journal of Public Policy Vol. 62, No. 2. 
Frenkel, Max (1984) ‘Föderalismus und Bundesstaat’, Vol. 1, Bern: Lang Verlag. 
From, Johan & Per Stava (1993) ‘Implementation of Community Law: The last Stronghole of 
National Control?’, in Andersen, Svein S. & Kjell A. Eliassen (eds.) Making Policy in 
Europe, London: SAGE. 
Grant, Alan (2004) The American political process, seventh edition, London & New York:  
Routledge.  
Hanf, Kenneth & Theo Toonen (eds.) (1985) Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary 
Systems, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publ. 
Hänni, Peter (1993) ‘Die Kantone und Europa’, in Aspects du droit européen, Festgabe zum 
Schweizerischen Jursitentage 1993, Fribourg. 
Hill, Heather C. (2003) ‘Understanding Implementation – Street-Level Bureaucrats’ 
Resources for Reform’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 13, 
No. 3. 
Hix, Simon (1999) The Political System of the European Union, Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Héritier, Adrienne (1993) ‘Policy-Analyse - Kritik und Neuorientierung’, Politische 
Viertelsjahresschrift, Sonderheft No. 24, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Klöti, Ulrich & Søren Dosenrode (1994) Anpassung von Kleinstaatexekutiven an die 
Europäische Integration, Schweizerische Nationalfondsprojekt 12-32365.91, Universität 
Zürich. Updatet version 1998 – not published. 
Klöti, Ulrich et al. (1999) Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Zürich: NZZ Verlag. 
Kriesi, H. (1995), Le système politique Suisse, Collection politique compare, Economica, 
Paris. 
Lähteenmäki-Schmidt (2007)  ‘The Regions in the New Europe’, in Søren Dosenrode (ed.) 
Approaching the EUropean Federation, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Lowi, Theodore J. (1972) ‘Four systems of policy politics and choice’, Public Administrative 
Review, 32, pp. 298-310.  
Mazey, S. & J. Richardson (1993) Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
McKay, David (2001) Designing Europe – Comparative Lessons from the Federal 
Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe – Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht, London: UCL Press. 
Müller, Mechthild (1993) ‘Die Mitwirkung der Länderparlamente in Bundesrat- und 
Europaangelegenheiten’  Die Öffentliche Verwalung, Februry, journal (Heft) 3. 
Kissling- Näf, Ingrid & Sonja Wälti (1999) ‘Der Vollzug öffentlicher Politiken’, in  Klöti, 
Ulrich et al., Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, Z¨rich: NZZ Verlag.  
Painter, Martin (1991) ‘Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: An Institutional Analysis’, 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXIV: 2 June.  
Painter, Martin (2000) ‘When adversaries collaborate: conditional co-operation in Australia’s 
arm’s length federal polity’, Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute (ed.), Federalism and political 
performance, London: Routledge. 
Parsons, Wayne (1995) Public Policy, Aldershot & Brooksfield: Edward Elgar. 
 29
Peters, Guy B. (2000) ‘The Commission and Implementation in the EU’, in Neill Nugent (ed.) 
At the Heat of the Union – Studies of the European Union, 2nd  edition, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave  
Pierson, Paul (1995) ‘Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development 
of Social Policy’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 
Vol. 8, No. 4. 
Politische Viertelsjahresschrift Polic-Analyse – Kritik und Neuorientierung, Adrienne Héritier 
(ed.) (1993) Sonderheft Nr. 24, Opladen: Westdeutcher Verlag. 
Pressman, J. L. & A. Wildavsky (1973) Implementation, Berkly: University of California 
Press  
Riccucci, Norma M. (2005) ‘Street-Level Bureaucrats and Interstate Variation in the 
Implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Policies’, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 15, No. 1.  
Sabatier, Paul A. (1986) ‘Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation 
research’, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1.  
Sabatier, Paul A. (1993) ‘Advocacy-Koalitionen, Policy-Wandel und Policy-Lernen – Eine 
Alternative zur Phasenheuristik’, in Adrienne Hértier (ed.) Policy-Analyse – Kritik und 
Neuorientierung, Politische Vierteljahresheft, Sonderheft Nr. 24, Opladen: Westdeutcher 
Verlag.  
Sabatier, P. & H. C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.) (1993) Policy Change and Learning - An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Saunders, Cheryl (2002) ‘Collaborative Federalism’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 61, No. 2.  
Scharpf, Fritz W. (2006) ‘Die Kleinen haben Angst vor Konkurrenz’ intervied by Christian 
Füller, die tageszeitung, 8.5.2006 
Scharpf, Fritz W., Bernd Reissert & Fritz Schnabel (eds.) (1976), Politikverflechtung – 
Theorie und Emperie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik, Kroenberg: 
Scriptor Verlag. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., Bernd Reissert & Fritz Schnabel (eds.) (1977) Politikverflechtung II – 
Kritik und Berichte aus der Praxis, Königstein: Athenäum Verlag.  
Schofield, Jill & Charlotte Sausman (2004) ‘Symposion on Implementing Public Policy – 
Introduction’, Public Administration, Vol. 82, No. 2.  
Self, P. (1985) Political Theories of Modern Government – its Role and Reform, London: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Selway, Bradley (2001) ‘The Federation – What Makes It Work and What Should We Be 
Thinking About for the Future’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 60, No. 
4.  
Serdült, Uwe & Thomas Widmer (eds.) (2003) Politik im Fokus, Zürich: NZZ Verlag. 
Siedentopf, H and J. Ziller (eds.) (1988) Making European Policies Work, Vol. 1 & 2, 
London: SAGE. 
Skogstad, Grace (2000) ‘Canada: Dual and Executive Federalism, Ineffective Problem-
Solving’, in Ditmar Braun (ed.), Public Policy and Federalism, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2005), Office for Official Publications of the 
European Community, Luxembourg.  
Thorlakson, Lori (2005) ‘Federalism and the European party system’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 12, Nr. 3 
Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute (ed.) (2000) Federalism and political performance, London: 
Routledge. 
Windhoff-Héritier, Adrienne (1987) Policy Analyse, Frankfurt: Campusverlag. 
 30
Weber, Karl (1980) ‘Kriterien des Bundesstaates – Eine systematische, historische und 
rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung der Bundesstaatlichkeit der Schweiz, der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Österreichs’, Schriftenreihe des Instituts für 
Föderalismusforschung, Band 18, Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller. 
Wältli, Sonja & Anne-Béatrice Bullinger (2001) ’Regional Policy and Energy Policy in the 
Light of Swiss Federalism’ in Braun, Dietmar, Public Policy and Federalism, Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
www.bundesrat.de/Site/Inhalt/DE/3_20Konferenzen/index,templateId=renderUnterseiteKomp
lett.html 
www.kdk.ch/int/kdk/de/kdk.html 
www.noe.gv.at/service/lad/lad1/Adressen/Verbindungsstelle.htm 
www.vorarlberg.at/vorarlberg/regionen_europa/europa/europa/weitereinformationen/vorarlbe
rgineuropa/willenbildungsprozess.htm 
Zuleeg, Manfred (1992) ‘Die Stellung der Länder und Regionen im europäischen 
Integrationsprozess’, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, (Heft 20), October 15th. 
 
 
 31
CCIS RESEARCH SERIES 
WORKING PAPERS: 
 
No. 1. Dr. Wolfgang Zank: The Expanding EU: Ever more diversified people become “united ever 
more closely”, 25 pp, 2006. 
   
No. 2. Søren Dosenrode: Federal and European Union Policy Making – A Comparative Perspective, 31 
pp, 2007. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
